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SHOPLIFTING: PROTECTION FOR MERCHANTS IN
WISCONSIN
The crime of shoplifting has grown to major proportions. It has
been estimated that in Metropolitan Milwaukee, for the year 1972,
approximately $40 million worth of merchandise was taken from
area stores. For the state as a whole, the figure approximates $110
million. Nationally, for the year 1970, over $7 billion was taken by
the nation's shoplifters.'
Probably the main factor in the sudden rise in shoplifting has
been the advent of self-service. Fewer clerks result in increased
temptation. Other factors which are cited for the rise in this crime
are the breakdown of the general moral fabric, inflation and the
high cost of living.
Despite the fact that this is thievery, many shoplifters feel that
shoplifting is not illegal. Some shoplifters state that they take
merchandise simply to avoid a long wait in line in order to pay for
it. They justify this on the basis that they have purchased overly-
priced merchandise from the store on previous occasions and the
store surely won't miss one item. Others feel that by shoplifting
they can show their hostility against the "establishment". One
other reason for the increase in shoplifting has been the need of
those individuals in dire need of drugs to obtain money. This type
of shoplifter will return the goods that he has stolen and receive a
cash refund for them. 2
The increase in shoplifting has occurred despite the efforts of
merchants. They have utilized various techniques to combat sho-
plifting. These include trained store detectives, electronic cameras,
I. These figures were obtained through the courtesy of the Downtown Association of
Milawukee.
2. The crime of shoplifting can be committed in any number of ways. Probably the most
common situation is where the suspect will simply take some item off a shelf and stick it in
his pocket, or perhaps the pocket of one of his children, with the hope that no one has seen
him do so.
Because of the dangerousness of this method, shoplifters have discovered other, more
stealthy, techniques. These include taking clothes into a dressing room and putting them
on under baggy outter garments or, in the case of very heavy women, inserting metal clips
on the inside of their dresses and then simply clipping items on underneath their dresses.
In conjunction with this, quite a bit of merchandise is found concealed in women's undergar-
ments.
Finally, one last method which has become quite popular is the trick of price-tag
switching. This involves taking a price tag off a lower priced item and putting it over a more
expensive one. This method is extremely popular with those individuals who feel that
although stealing is a crime, price-tag switching is not.
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electronic sales-tags, two-way mirrors, and cooperation between
stores in passing pictures and information about known
shoplifters.3
However, enforcement against shoplifters has presented prob-
lems to merchants. Prosecution against shoplifters can lead to poor
public relations and also be very time consuming and cause great
inconvenience to the merchant. Besides this, one of the greatest
problems faced by the merchant is the possibility of a suit being
instituted against him by the accused shoplifter. This could include
an action based on any of the following: false imprisonment, false
arrest, unlawful detention, malicious prosecution, assault and bat-
tery, or slander.
The purpose of this article is to explore the possible liability of
the merchant for stopping a suspected shoplifter and the effect that
Wisconsin Statute section 943.50 will have in the efforts to reduce
some of this liability.
I. THE MERCHANT'S COMMON LAW LIABILITY
At common law there were three basic rules which could be
said to potentially apply to shoplifting.
First, one in possession of real or personal property was privi-
leged to defend it by use of force if the actor reasonably believed
that the other's intrusion could be prevented or terminated only by
the immediate infliction of harmful or offensive contact.' In other
words, the one in possession, if he had a superior right to the
property, had a privilege to resist a trespass to the property by the
use of reasonable force which would otherwise amount to assault,
battery, false imprisonment or false arrest.5 This privilege did not
arise where the intruder had a privilege to intrude upon the prop-
erty or where there was no immediate and urgent necessity to take
action. Also, if the individual acted upon a reasonable, though
mistaken, belief that the intrusion was not privileged, he would be
liable for any offensive contact unless the intruder intentionally or
negligently caused the actor's mistake.'
However, the defense of possession of property was not adapta-
ble to protecting the merchant from liability. By necessity, the
3. BUSINESS WEEK, June 27, 1970 at 73.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 77 (1965).
5. Cole v. Rowen, 88 Mich. 219,50 N.W. 138 (1891) (servant); Hoagland v. Forest Park
Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335, 70 S.W. 878 (1902) (finder of property).
6. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at comment (f).
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merchant must allow individuals to enter his store and examine the
goods before purchasing them. A merchant could not reasonably
believe that a customer would steal his goods until the customer
had pocketed or concealed the goods without paying for them and
then exited the store. By that time complete dispossession had
occurred and the merchant could not assert that he was acting in
defense of possession of his property. 7
The second common law rule which could be said to apply to
shoplifting is that pertaining to the recapture of chattels. Accord-
ing to this doctrine, the use of force against another for the sole
purpose of retaking possession of a chattel is privileged if the
chattel was tortiously taken from the actor's possession, the actor
was entitled to immediate possession of the chattel, action was
taken by the actor promptly after his dispossession or after his
timely discovery of dispossession and the amount of force exerted
to recapture the chattel was only that which was reasonably neces-
sary to effect the recapture.' In essence, the merchant would be
allowed to recapture his chattels under the theory of fresh pursuit9
if he used reasonable force. The actor's reasonable but mistaken
belief that another had tortiously taken his property did not create
the privilege described by this doctrine unless the mistake was
induced by the intruder.
However, the doctrine of fresh pursuit is very limited and most
courts do not rely upon it as a justification for false imprisonment
or false arrest. They look instead to the laws of arrest.
This brings us to the third common law rule pertaining to
shoplifting. Under the common law a private citizen was privileged
to arrest another under two situations: (1) he could make an arrest
for a felony if the felony had in fact been committed and the
arrested person committed it; (2) he could make an arrest for a
misdemeanor which constituted a breach of the peace and which
was committed in his presence.'"
When this doctrine is examined in the light of case law in
Wisconsin it soon becomes evident that a merchant will not be
privileged in arresting a shoplifter without a warrant, even if the
7. Comment, "Shoplifters" Beware? Detention of Suspected Shoplifters, 11 DRAKE L.
REv. 31 (1961).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 101 (1965).
9. WIs. STAT. § 976.04(5) (1969). This statute states that close pursuit includes fresh
pursuit. Close pursuit "shall not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but pursuit without
unreasonable delay."
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 119 (1965).
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misdemeanor was committed in his presence. In the case of
Radloff v. National Food Stores, Inc.," the court held that the
store employees had no right to arrest a shoplifter as the alleged
crime was a misdemeanor and the employees did not have a war-
rant to arrest the shoplifter. In applying the common law to the
Radloff case the court said that the authority of a private citizen
to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed in his
presence "should be limited to instances where the public security
requires it, that is to acts which involve, threaten, or incite viol-
ence." ' 2 The court concluded that misdemeanor theft did not con-
stitute a breach of the peace in that sense.
After examining the common law closely, it soon becomes evi-
dent that little protection was afforded a merchant in his struggle
to prevent shoplifting.
Prior to 1969 there were several laws enacted by the Wisconsin
Legislature which could also have been interpreted as dealing with
shoplifting.
Wisconsin Statute section 939.49 authorizes a merchant or his
employee, acting upon reasonable belief that another person is
unlawfully interferring with the merchant's property, to use rea-
sonable force to prevent or terminate such interference. This ap-
parently provides a defense to an action for battery where the
storekeeper reasonably believes a theft occurred and uses reason-
able force upon an innocent person. However, the statute provides
only a defense to criminal liability for use of force upon another
person. Although the language of the statute does not expressly
limit its applicability to criminal actions, the statute was enacted
as part of the 1955 Wisconsin Criminal Code and is classified
under the subchapter heading "Defenses to Criminal Liability".
Since storekeepers are primarily concerned with the defense of civil
suits which may arise incident to recapture, the statute seems to
be of little value to them. 13
The possible alternative for the merchant, prior to 1969, was
to have a police officer arrest the shoplifter with or without a
warrant. Wisconsin Statute section 954.03(l) (1967) provided that
"an arrest by a peace officer without a warrant for a misdemeanor
• . . is lawful whenever the officer has reasonable grounds to be-
Il. 20 Wis. 2d 224, 121 N.W.2d 865, reh. denied, 20 Wis. 2d 237a, 123 N.W.2d 570
(1963).
12. Id. at 237b, 123 N.W.2d at 571.
13. Note, The Shoplifting Arrest Problem in Wisconsin, 1964 Wis. L. REV. 478.
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lieve that the person to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor
• . . and will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested."'14
In view of the above common law rules and statutory enact-
ments it appears that prior to 1969, although a merchent could
recover his property from the shoplifter, that was the extent of his
authority. Any arrest of the shoplifter would have to be made
pursuant to an arrest warrant utilized by a police officer. If the
merchant detained a suspected shoplifter until the police officer
arrived to make an arrest, the merchant could be subjected to
liability upon one of the following grounds: false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, assault and battery or slander.
Of these five, false imprisonment was and still is the primary
threat to the merchant because little is needed to constitute a cause
of action sounding in it. In essence, all that need be proved is an
unjustified restraint.
False imprisonment is basically the unlawful restraint by one
person of the physical liberty of another. 5 Mere loss of freedom
cannot constitute false imprisonment even though it is unjust; the
imprisonment must be unlawful. 6 In order to constitute a false
imprisonment, it is essential that there be some restraint of the
person. The restraint or detention which constitutes fase imprison-
ment may be brought about by the imposition of either actual or
apparent barriers. It is not necessary that there be confinement in
jail or prison. All that is said to be necessary is that the liberty of
the individual be restrained against his will and without sufficient
authority either directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any
means. The wrong may be committed by acts or words or both,
and by merely operating upon the will of the individual or by
personal violence or both.17 A wrongful restraint, for even a slight
amount of time, is actionable without any showing of actual dam-
ages.'5 However, a voluntary submission to a request is not an
imprisonment, 9 nor is involuntary submission actionable if it is
under lawful process or is otherwise justied.
14. Wis. STAT. § 954.03(1) which referred only to misdemeanors, contained limitations
which were abolished by § 968.07. This new section increased the power of a law enforce-
ment oflicer to arrest for all crimes when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a person
has committed a crime.
15. Lane v. Collins, 29 Wis. 2d 66, 69, 138 N.W.2d 264 (1965).
16. 32 Am. JUR. 2d False Imprisonment § 8 (1967).
17. Id. at§ II.
18. George v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 78 W. Va. 345, 88 S.E. 1036 (1916).
19. Lester v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N.E.2d 529 (1952).
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False imprisonment is clearly distinct from malicious prosecu-
tion. False imprisonment proceeds "upon the theory that the plain-
tiff has been arrested without authority or law and unlawfully
deprived of his liberty, while (malicious prosecution) proceeds
upon the theory that the plaintiff has been lawfully arrested under
a warrant charging a criminal offense, and that such prosecution
is malicious and without probable cause." 20
Basically, most cases speak of false arrest in the same breath
with false imprisonment, and again with malicious prosecution.
The distinction lies in the existence of valid legal authority for the
arrest.2'
There are justifications for an imprisonment which can serve
as a defense to any false imprisonment action. One justification for
an imprisonment is found under the law of arrest. As mentioned
previously, at common law a private citizen was privileged to arrest
another under two situations: (1) he could make an arrest for a
felony if the felony had in fact been committed in his presence and
the arrested person committed it; (2) he could make an arrest for
a misdemeanor which constituted a breach of the peace and which
was comitted in his presence."
A second justification is the privilege of temporarily detaining
a suspected thief for investigation. This privilege is set forth in the
Restatement (Second) Torts:
One who reasonably believes that another has tortiously taken a
chattel upon his premises, or has failed to make due cash pay-
ment for a chattel purchased or services rendered there, is privi-
leged, without arresting the other, to detain him on the premises
for the time necessary for a reasonable investigation of the
facts.2
The privilege to detain a suspected thief differs from the privi-
lege of arrest in that it permits only a temporary detention on the
premises for only the time necessary in order to conduct a reasona-
ble investigation. What is reasonable will depend upon all the cir-
cumstances, including the nature of the misconduct suspected, the
amount involved, the explanation or denial offered by the other,
20. Barfield v. J.L. Coker & Co., 73 S.C. 181, 53 S.E. 170 (1906).
21. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 12 (3d ed. 1964); 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 4 (1960).
When the detention is accomplished by reason of asserted legal authority the term false
arrest is proper. False arrest embraces a false imprisonment and the only distinction is that
a false imprisonment contemplates a discourse of action between private persons.
22. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 120A (1965).
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his willingness to cooperate and the time required to consult read-
ily available sources of information.24 The primary advantage of-
fered by this privilege is that it protects the storekeeper who has
made a reasonable mistake in believing that a theft has occurred. 5
However, prior to 1969, this privilege apparently offered no
solution to the shoplifting problem in Wisconsin.20 This was be-
cause of the distinction drawn by the Restatement between deten-
tion and arrest.27 Under the Restatement, a detention within the
scope of the privilege is a temporary restraint imposed for the
purpose of investigating the possibility of theft of the actor's chat-
tel, while an arrest is a taking of a person into custody for the
purpose of instituting a criminal proceeding against him. The latter
is not privileged unless justification is found under the arrest stat-
utes32
II. EFFECT OF WISCONSIN STATUTE SECTION 943.50
It is apparent that prior to 1969 the merchant was not offered
much protection against shoplifters. Because of stringent require-
24. Id. at comment (f).
25. Id. at comment (e).
26. Supra note 13, at 482. The article stated that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had
not, at the time of the Radloff case (1961), ruled on whether this privilege should apply in
Wisconsin. This opinion was based on the fact that the governor had vetoed a bill which
would have created the privilege in Wisconsin. Supposedly the governor vetoed the bill on
the ground that it might have intruded upon the rights of innocent citizens. Message return-
ing Bill No. 339, S., Senate Journal, (August 16, 1963) 1806.
This footnote goes on to add that one cannot be certain what weight the court would
accord to the vetoed bill if asked to rule whether the privilege existed in Wisconsin as a
common law right. Traditionally, the court had viewed a defeated bill as an expression of
legislative intent that the existing law should not be changed. Schwenkoff v. Farmers
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 44, 93 N.W.2d 867 (1959); Yoeckel v. Samonig,
272 Wis. 430, 76 N.W.2d 925 (1956). But the court did disregard this view and abolished
the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort, notwithstanding legislative failure to
adopt corrective enactments. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1962). However, a vetoed bill can be distinguished from a bill which has failed to pass the
houses of the legislature, as a vetoed bill evidences legislative intent to change the law rather
than preserve the status quo. The comment went on to add that the court may possibly
recognize the privilege as a common law right if the issue was squarely presented to the
court in the future.
However, since the passage of WIs. STAT. § 943.50 (1969) there can be no doubt that
the privilege applies in Wisconsin.
27. Peloquin v. Hibner, 231 Wis. 77, 84, 285 N.W. 280, 284 (1939).
An arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either by
touching or putting hands on him, or by any act which indicates an intention to take
him into custody and subjects the person arrested to the actual control and will of
the person making the arrest.
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at Comment (d).
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ments of justifiable arrest and the consequent need for protection
of the merchants, Wisconsin has moved, with a growing number
of states, to recognize probable cause as a defense to an action for
the detention of a suspected shoplifter, whether it be for a misde-
meanor or not.
In 1969, Assembly Bill 730 was passed to enact section 943.50
of the statutes which created the crime of shoplifting.29 The act, in
general, provides that the intentional concealment of unpurchased
merchandise is evidence of an intent to deprive the merchant per-
manently of the possession of the goods without paying for them.
In addition, the discovery of unpurchased merchandise concealed
upon the person or among his belongings or concealed by a person
upon the person or belongings of another is evidence of intentional
concealment. The purpose of this statute was to recognize probable
cause as a defense in an action for the detention of a suspected
shoplifter. Therefore, the statute provides that a merchant, mer-
chant's adult employee or peace officer who has probable cause for
believing that a person has violated this statute may detain the
person for a reasonable length of time to make an investigation.
Proof of such probable cause and the reasonableness of the deten-
tion is a legal defense to any civil or criminal action for false
imprisonment.
In many states the validity of a statute creating the separate
crime of shoplifting has been upheld on the grounds that there is a
reasonable basis for regarding theft committed in a store or other
mercantile establishment as a separate social evil distinct from
theft committed under other circumstances."
Because of the importance of this statute to many merchants,
each subsection will be analyzed separately.
A. Subsection (1)
Whoever intentionally alters indicia of price or value of mer-
chandise or who takes and carries away, transfers, conceals or
retains possession of merchandise held for resale, by a merchant
without his consent and with intent to deprive the merchant per-
manently of possession or the full purchase price of such mer-
chandise may be penalized as provided in subsection (4). 31
29. Prior to the enactment of Wis. STAT. § 943.50 most shoplifters, because of the small
amount stolen, were prosecuted under Wis. STAT. § 943.20(3)(a) (1969).
30. 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 1(5) (1968).
31. WIS. STAT. § 943.50(4) deals with the penalties imposed for being convicted of
[Vol. 57
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The purpose of this subsection is to define what action consti-
tutes the crime of shoplifting in Wisconsin. The statute refers to a
situation where a person intentionally alters a price tag or the value
of merchandise. This phrase was included in the definition of sho-
plifting because a popular form of this crime is to take a price tag
off a lower priced item and either put it over the price tag of a
higher priced item or remove the other tag completely and put the
lower priced tag on the higher priced item. In this manner, al-
though the individual is still paying for the item he is defrauding
the merchant of part of the item's value. Therefore, it would ap-
pear that the purpose of this phrase is to try to stop this type of
conduct by defining it as shoplifting.
It should also be noted that besides the intentional alteration
of price the statute also states that one "who takes and carries
away, transfers, conceals or retains possession of merchandise held
for resale, by a merchant without his consent and with intent to
deprive the merchant permanently of possession, or the full pur-
chase price of such merchandise" is guilty of shoplifting. In con-
junction with this last sentence, Wisconsin Statute section
943.20(l)(a) 2 which defines theft should be examined.
When this comparison is made it becomes apparent that the
wording of these two sections is quite similar, which leads to the
conclusion that although shoplifting is an alternative form of
prosecution for theft this special definition is needed in order to
define under what factual circumstances probable cause will serve
as a legal defense to a civil action for false imprisonment.
This definition of shoplifting should not be confused with theft
under section 943.20(l)(a) for section 943.50 can only be resorted
to when "merchandise held for resale by a merchant is taken with-
out his consent and with an intent to deprive the merchant perma-
nently of possession or the full purchase price" of the merchandise.
If there are goods taken from the store which are not held for
resale-such as furniture or items in the manager's office-then
the individual guilty of taking these goods would be prosecuted
under section 943.20(l)(a) and not under section 943.50.
shoplifting. The penalties imposed are the same as those under Wis. STAT. § 943.50(3)(a),
(b) & (c).
32. Wis. STAT. § 943.20(I)(a) (1969) provides that:
Whoever does any of the following may be penalized as provided in sub. (3) (a):
Intentionally takes and carries away, uses, transfers, conceals, or retains possession
of movable property of another without his consent and with intent to deprive the
owner permanently of possession of such property.
19731
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However, this subsection is not complete in and of itself for it
does leave some questions unanswered. For example, in order to
determine what constitutes the crime of shoplifting one would have
to know how the terms "merchant" and "merchandise held for
resale" are defined. 33 Probably these would not include failures
to pay for the fare for train or bus rides, or the admission to
theaters, amusement parks, or circuses. But does it cover the fail-
ure to pay for a meal in a restaurant?
B. Subsection (2)
The intentional concealment of unpurchased merchandise
which continues from one floor to another or beyond the last
station for receiving payments in a merchant's store is evidence
of intent to deprive the merchant permanently of possession of
such merchandise without paying the purchase price thereof. The
discovery of unpurchased merchandise concealed upon the per-
son or among the belongings of such person or concealed by a
person upon the person or among the belongings of another is
evidence of intentional concealment on the part of the person so
concealing such goods.
The purpose of this subsection is to alleviate the necessity for
proving independently an intent to deprive the merchant perma-
nently of possession of the shoplifted article.
In order to obtain a conviction under section 943.20(l)(a) it is
necessary to prove that the defendant, among other things, took
and carried, used, transferred, concealed or retained possession of
property with intent to deprive the owner permanently of its
possession.31
The Wisconsin Jury Instructions-Criminal provides that:
The intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of
his property means that the defendant has a purpose permanently
to deprive the owner of such possession. You cannot look into a
man's mind to find out his intent. While this intent to deprive the
owner permanently of possession of his property must be found
as a fact before you can find the defendant guilty of theft (under
section 943.20(l)(a)), it must be found, if found at all, from his
acts and his words and statements, if any, bearing upon his in-
33. For example, 22 OKL. ST. ANN. § 1343 (1970) provides definitions to these and
other terms before defining the crime of shoplifting. Even WXIs. STAT. § 943.20(2)(b), which
defines theft in Wisconsin provides a definition as to what constitutes movable property
under Wis. STAT. § 943.20(l)(a).
34. Wis. J.l.-Criminal 1441 Theft (Larceny).
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tent. When there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut the
presumption, the law presumes that a reasonable person intends
all of the natural, probable, and usual consequences of his delib-
erate acts. 5
Much of this proof necessary to show intent under section
943.20(1)(a) is alleviated by subsection (2), for if unpurchased mer-
chandise is found concealed upon the person or among his belong-
ings or found concealed by the person upon the person or among
the belongings of another when the person has passed to another
floor or beyond the last station for receiving payment for the item,
then such concealment is deemed intentional concealment which
is evidence of an intent to deprive the merchant permanently of
possession of such merchandise.
The only question which remains unanswered is whether the
intentional concealment of unpurchased merchandise which is evi-
dence of an intent to deprive the merchant permanently of posses-
sion is an inference, rebuttable presumption, or a conclusive pre-
sumption. If this subsection simply means that such evidence is
admissible on the intention to deprive the merchant permanently
of possession but not that a presumption is raised, the merchant is
in little better position than before the statute was adopted, be-
cause finding unpurchased goods on a person in a store would be
admissible as relevant and material on the question of intent to
deprive the merchant permanently of possession even without the
statute.
36
However, this question appears to have been answered in the
case of State v. Johnson.17 There the court stated:
Mere possession of stolen property raises no inference of
guilt, but Wisconsin from early times has followed the rule that
unexplained possession of recently stolen goods raises an infer-
ence of greater or less weight, depending upon the circumstances
• . . Such inference, being in the nature of a presumption of fact,
calls for an explanation of how the possessor obtained the prop-
erty. Such presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted.,
The first sentence of this subsection talks about the intentional
35. Id. at comment.
36. II DRAKE L. REV. 31, 47 (1961). The original draft of Assembly Bill 730 provided
that intentional concealment was prima facie evidence but this was deleted by Amendment
8.
37. II Wis. 2d 130, 104 N.W.2d 379 (1960).
38. Id. at 139, 104 N.W.2d at 384.
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concealment of unpurchased merchandise which continues from
one floor to another or beyond the last station for receiving pay-
ments in a merchant's store.
When the statute talks about taking unpurchased merchandise
from one floor to another it would appear that the situation they
are referring to is where there is a separate check-out counter for
each floor. If there was no check-out counter on the floor it would
be difficult to say that the merchandise was unpurchased for the
individual had not yet had an opportunity to pay for it.
In conjunction with this, the statute makes no reference to a
situation where the store may have only one floor in which some
departments have their own check-out counters. Apparently, under
the statute the individual would not be guilty of shoplifting if he
failed to pay in the department where he obtained the item unless
he also failed to pay at the last general check-out station.
The first sentence also states that if the individual continues
past the last station for payment in the merchant's store without
paying for the merchandise then this is evidence of an intent to
deprive the merchant permanently of possession of the merchan-
dise. The question which is not answered is whether the shoplifter
has to be apprehended while still in the merchant's store or whether
the individual can be apprehended outside the store and, if so, does
the apprehension have to take place within the immediate vicinity
of the store. 9 The Restatement 0 allows a merchant to detain an
individual on the premises in order to make a reasonable investiga-
tion of whether the individual had tortiously taken the chattel or
failed to make payment for it. However, the Caveat to this section
states that, "no opinion is expressed as to whether there may be
circumstances under which the privilege may extend to the deten-
tion of one who has left the premises but is in its immediate vicin-
ity."
Despite the fact that the Restatement expresses no opinion on
this subject, others have. Logically, the right to detain should not
be confined to suspects apprehended on the premises themselves,
but should extend to fresh pursuit reasonably near the premises.',
39. Assembly Amendment I to Assembly Bill 730 deleted the words "inside or outside"
from the original wording of the bill. It originally provided that, "[t]he intentional conceal-
ment of unpurchased merchandise inside or outside the merchant's store .
40. Supra note 23, at Caveat.
41. Note, Merchants Liability For False Imprisonment, 17 S.C.L. REV. 729 (1965). The
probable limits of fresh pursuit are prompt and persistent efforts to recover the property
without any undue lapse of time during which it may be said pursuit has come to a halt.
[Vol. 57
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To go to extremes, in J.C. Penney Co. v. O'Daniell,2 employees
pursued the plaintiff out of the store, in and out of several stores,
and finally stopped her aboard a bus. Applying Oklahoma law, the
case indicated that this was permissible.
A more reasonable interpretation was discussed in the case of
Bonkowski v. Arlan's Department Store,4 3 in which the Michigan
Supreme Court found that the privilege in favor of a merchant to
detain for reasonable investigation a person whom he reasonably
believes to have taken a chattel unlawfully extends to the detention
of one who has left the premises but is in the immediate vicinity.
To conclude the discussion on this subsection, the last sentence
states that "the discovery of unpurchased merchandise concealed
upon the person or among the belongings of such person or con-
cealed by a person upon the person or among the belongings of
another is evidence of intentional concealment on the part of the
person so concealing such goods." Apparently, this part was de-
signed to cover a situation where either the individual retains the
shoplifted item himself or where he takes the item but conceals it
in another's belongings-such as the pocket or purse of one of his
children. By the inclusion of the last part of this sentence, it is
possible to charge an individual with shoplifting even if the item
isn't found on his person or among his belongings. However, con-
viction would be subject to the probable cause requirement under
subsection (3), which, in this case, would be the observation by a
floorwalker of the individual taking the item without paying for it,
and the finding of the item concealed on the person or among the
belongings of another.
C. Subsection (3)
A merchant or merchant's adult employee who has probable
cause for believing that a person has violated this section in his
presence may detain such person in a reasonable manner for a
reasonable length of time to deliver him to a peace officer, or to
his parent or guardian in the case of a minor. The detained
person must be promptly informed of the purpose for the deten-
tion and be permitted to make phone calls, but he shall not be
W. PROSSER, TORTS § 22 (3d ed. 1964).
42. 263 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959).
43. 12 Mich. App. 88, 162 N.W.2d 347 (1969). rev'd on other grounds 383 Mich. 90,
174 N.W.2d 765 (1970). The court in this case felt that the privilege should be extended
despite the Restatement's caveat for the reason that a merchant may not be able to form
the reasonable belief justifying a detention for a reasonable period of time.
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interrogated or searched against his will before the arrival of a
peace officer who may conduct a lawful interrogation of the
accused person. Compliance with this subsection entitles the
merchant or his employee affecting the detention to the same
defense in any action as is available to a peace officer making
an arrest in the line of duty.
The purpose of this subsection is to provide that when a mer-
chant or one of his adult employees has probable cause to believe
that a person has committed the crime of shoplifting and in re-
sponse to this the suspected shoplifter is detained in accordance
with the guidelines set forth by this subsection, the merchant or his
adult employee has a valid defense against any action for false
imprisonment arising out of the detention. Prior to the enactment
of this statute the only protection the merchant had against shoplif-
ters was the privilege discussed earlier and the laws of arrest.
The key to this subsection is that a suspected shoplifter may
be detained only if the merchant or his adult employee has proba-
ble cause to believe that the person committed the crime in his
presence.
Probable cause to arrest must be measured by the facts of the
particular case and refers to that quantum of evidence which
would lead a reasonable police officer to believe, albeit based on
hearsay, that the defendant probably committed a crime. But it
is not necessary that the evidence be sufficient to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt or that guilt is more probable than
not, it being necessary only that the information lead a reasona-
ble officer to believe that guilt is more than a possibility."
This doctrine achieves the same result as the doctrine of defense
of possession of property allowing a merchant a reasonable mis-
take in detaining a suspected shoplifter.15
Wisconsin has not been the only state to adopt probable cause
as a justification for detaining a suspected shoplifter. Forty-three
states now have statutes extending some form of immunity to mer-
44. State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1970). Perhaps a better definition
is whether the facts available to the detaining party at the moment would warrant a reason-
ably prudent person to believe that the person in question had been shoplifting. 47 A.L.R.3d
998 (1973).
45. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3942 which allows a detention if done in a reasona-
ble manner for a reasonable length of time. However, the statute protects the merchant only
if the unpurchased goods are found concealed on the suspect. If it is later determined that
the merchant acted under a mistaken but honest suspicion, the statute will not aid him.
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chants who detain suspected shoplifters."
Prior to the recognition of probable cause as a defense, there
was clear authority under the common law for an involuntary
detention that did not amount to an arrest. In California, in 1936,
the doctrine of probable cause as a defense for detaining a sus-
pected shoplifter was introduced. In the case of Collyer v. S.H.
Kress Co., 47 a man was seen by several store employees putting
46. CODE OF ALA., TIT. 14, § 334(1) (1958); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-33 (1961);
11 DEL. C. § 647 (1970); F.S.A. § 811.022 (1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1005 (1968);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 663-2 (1967); S.H.A. ch. 38, § 10-3(c) (1970); IND. ANN. STAT.§ 10-
3044 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.24 (1972); K.S.A. § 21-5356 (1964); KRS § 433.236
(1969); LSA-C.CR.P. art. 215 (1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551A (1971); M.G.L.A.
c. 231, § 94B (1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2917 (1962); M.S.A. § 629.366 (1972);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 2374-04 (1971); V.A.M.S. § 537.125 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
402.01 (1964); NRS § 598.030 (1969); N.J.S.A. 2A:170-100 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40A-16-22 (1964); N.Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 218 (1968); N.C. GEN. STATS. § 14-
72.1 (1971); N.D. CEN. CODE § 29-06-27 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE § 29 35.041 (1971); 22
OKL. ST. ANN. § 1343 (1972); ORS § 164.392 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-359.4 (1971);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-824 (1972); VERNON'S ANN. P.C. art. 1436e (1972); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-13-32 (1971); RCWA 9.01.116 (1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3A-4 (1972);
W.S.A. § 943.50 (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-146.3 (1971).
Other states have statutes with various idiosyncrasies. Montana and Vermont give a
merchant the right to request an individual to place or keep in full view merchandise which
he has removed from display counters. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-213 (1970); V.S.A.
§ 2566 (1971).
Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota extend immunity only when the suspect
actually concealed unpurchased merchandise. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3942 (1964); 18 P.S.
§ 4816.1 (1963); SDCL § 22-37-24 (1967).
Arizona alone imposes no limitation that the detention must have been for a reasonable
time in a reasonable manner. A.R.S. § 13-675 (1972).
Virginia exempts a merchant from civil liability only when he causes an arrest and does
not provide immunity when he detains. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-126 (1971).
Eight jurisdictions have no statute protecting merchants who detain or cause the arrest
of the suspected shoplifter: Alaska, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho,
Maine, New Hampshire,and Rhode Island. Of these eight all but California have a statute
declaring shoplifting to be a crime.
47. 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936). In this case the court recognized that considerable
confusion existed as to whether or not probable cause was a defense to an action for false
imprisonment and admitted that statements had been made to the effect that probable cause
was no defense to actions for false imprisonment. After distinguishng the cases in which
such statements had been made, however, the court went on to say that probable cause was
a defense. Its language, frequently cited by other courts is as follows:
Ordinarily, the owner of property, in the exercise of his inherent right to protect
the same, is justified in restraining another who seeks to interfere with or injure it,
. . . However, there seems to exist considerable confusion in the cases as to whether
probable cause is a defense to false imprisonment cases involving misdemeanors. The
broad statement occasionally appears to the effect that probable cause is no defense
in actions for false imprisonment. . .The cited cases involved unlawful arrest under
the authority of illegal process issued in civil actions. In such instances, as in all cases
involving solely the legality of the process, it is obvious that probable cause is not
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various items in his pockets. As he was leaving the store, he was
stopped by a female store detective who escorted him to an upstairs
room under threat of calling the police. There he was detained for
questioning for twenty minutes until he was actually arrested by
the police. The court held that a property owner was justified in
detaining a person when he had probable cause to believe that the
person was stealing his property. The detention must be only for
the purpose of investigation of the circumstances48 and the investi-
gation must be conducted in a reasonable manner and only for a
reasonable time.49
The Restatement (Second) Torts codified this position in its
section 120A which influenced the development of the law in other
jurisdictions."
Although the spread of the Collyer doctrine has been slow, it
pertinent to any issue in the case. Because of like irrelevancy, the statement may
properly be made in cases of illegal arrest upon suspicion by a private person where,
by statutory authority or otherwise, he is permitted to make such an arrest only when
the offense is being committed in his presence. . . However, those authorities which
hold, where a person has reasonable grounds to believe that another is stealing his
property, as distinguished from those where the offense has been completed, that he
is justified in detaining the suspect for a reasonable length of time for the purpose
of investigation in a reasonable manner . . . must necessarily proceed upon the
theory that probable cause is a defense. And this is the law because the right to
protect one's property from injury has intervened. In an effort to harmonize the
individual right to liberty with a reasonable protection to the person or property of
the defendant, it should be said in such a charge of false imprisonment, where a
defendant had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was about to injure the
defendant in his person or property, even though such injury would constitute but a
misdemeanor, that probable cause is a defense provided, of course, that the detention
was reasonable. As already indicated, the rule should be different if the offense
believed to be in the process of commission related to the person or property of
another. And, of course, we may properly refer to probable cause as a defense in
false imprisonment cases as constituting that justification for the arrest which may
be announced by statutory enactment.
48. Examples of improper purposes of detention are: Banks v. Food Town, Inc., 98 So.
2d 719, 721 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (conducting a search without a warrant); Teel v. May
Department Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 707, 155 S.W.2d 74, 79 (1941) (extorting a
confession).
49. A third limitation was set forth by the court. This was that the privilege was
applicable only in cases where the suspect was believed to be stealing property "as distin-
guished from those where the offense has been completed." 5 Cal. 2d at 180, 54 P.2d at 23.
This limitation was ignored in a case decided five days later in which the suspect was
detained when he had already stolen an article and was on the sidewalk outside the store.
Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., I I Cal. App. 2d 430, 54 P.2d 24 (1936). This limitation
has subsequently been ignored by jurisdictions which have followed Collyer in other re-
spects. See, Comment, The Protection and Recapture of Merchandise From Shoplifters,
47 Nw. U.L. REv. 82 (1952).
50. Supra note 43, at 351.
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now appears that the desire of the merchants for increased immun-
ity from suit has been answered, at least in Wisconsin, by recogniz-
ing probable cause as a defense to an action for false imprison-
ment. However, because the plaintiff in a false imprisonment ac-
tion need not allege or prove want of probable cause, the burden
of proving the existence of probable cause as an element of justifi-
cation is on the one asserting the lawfulness of the detention.
51
Where the facts of the case are not in dispute, probable cause
is a question of law for the court to decide. If there is conflicting
evidence on the issue of probable cause, then it is a jury question.12
However, perhaps in one specific instance the issue of probable
cause will not even be litigated. This would occur in the situation
where the accused is brought to trial for shoplifting and the issue
of probable cause is litigated there. At a subsequent trial for false
imprisonment, the issue of probable cause could not be litigated
again because of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.53 Therefore,
the ruling from the previous trial on this issue would govern.
In Wisconsin, probable cause will serve as a defense to an
action for false imprisonment if the merchant or one of his adult
employees has probable cause to believe that the crime was com-
mitted in the presence of such merchant or adult employee.
In most cases, this means that the merchant or his adult em-
ployee must have seen the suspect take the item, retain it, and fail
to pay for it. If these events occur, there is probable cause to
believe that the individual has committed the crime of shoplifting.
However, a problem arises when a customer informs the merchant
or one of his employees that he has seen another customer take
merchandise and put it in his pockets. Is the customer's word
sufficient to establish probable cause so that a merchant or his
adult employee would be justified in detaining the individual? Ac-
cording to section 943.50(3), the customer's warning to the mer-
chant or his employee would probably not be sufficient to establish
probable cause to detain the suspect because the crime must have
51. J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So. 2d 679 (1963); Isiah v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., I I I Ohio App. 537, 174 N.E.2d 128, 86 A.L.R.2d 435 (1959); Teel v.
May Department Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W.2d 74, 137 A.L.R. 495 (1941).
52. Southwest Drug Stores of Mississippi, Inc. v. Garner, 195 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1967);
Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., II Cal. App. 2d 430, 54 P.2d 24 (1936); Collyer v. S.H.
Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
53. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Collateral estoppel means simply that when
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.
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been committed in the presence of the merchant or his employee
before probable cause will serve as a defense to an action for false
imprisonment.
However, ordinarily when a police officer is making an arrest,
hearsay information may be used to determine whether the officer
had probable cause to make an arrest. 4 Because the statute here
deals with a mere detention instead of an arrest, why shouldn't the
merchant or his employee be allowed to detain a suspect based on
hearsay information from a customer? Perhaps the refusal to allow
hearsay to act as a basis for establishing probable cause in this
situation is to protect citizens as much as possible from an unjusti-
fied detention. One of the reasons for the failure of prior shoplift-
ing bills to pass the legislature was the concern that this privilege
of detention would impinge upon the rights of innocent citizens.
Therefore, when this bill was passed the privilege to detain was
limited to certain instances, presumably to afford citizens as much
protection as possible against unjustified detention. Freedom from
improper restraint is one of the most basic rights in a free society,
and any expansion of the merchant's arrest power must be consid-
ered for its possible effects upon this right.55
If the merchant has probable cause to believe that an individual
has taken some item from his store, then he may detain him until
the police arrive. This privilege empowers the merchant only to
detain a suspected shoplifter. There is a distinction between arrest
and detention. In order to constitute an arrest, a person must be
taken into custody for the purpose of instituting a criminal pro-
ceeding against him. Detention, within the scope of the privilege,
is a temporary restraint imposed for the purpose of investigating
the possibility of theft of the actor's chattel.56
In examining the first sentence of subsection (3) it should be
noted that only the merchant or one of his adult employees may
detain the suspected shoplifter if they have probable cause to do
soY When this section of the statutes was created, the age of
54. Supra note 44, at 625.
55. Supra note 26, at 487.
56. Supra note 23, at comment (d).
57. Assembly Amendment 4 tried to substitute the words "manager or supervisor" for
employee but this amendment was defeated. Assembly Amendment 5 tried to limit those
individuals who would be privileged to detain a suspected shoplifter. It provided that:
No person detaining another shall come under this subsection unless he has
received three hours of instruction in the law of crimes against property and false
imprisonment by the local police in a manner approved by the department of justice.
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majority in Wisconsin was twenty-one. However, since the passage
of Senate Bill 453,11 the age of majority in Wisconsin has been
lowered to the age of eighteen. Therefore, any employee eighteen
years or older should be justified in detaining a suspected shoplifter
if he has probable cause to do so." This creates a problem, for
minors are allowed to work in Wisconsin if the requirements of
Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 103 are met. If section 943.50 is fol-
lowed, a minor employee, despite the fact that he has seen an
individual intentionally conceal an item and fail to pay for it, may
not detain a suspected shoplifter without fear of being liable for an
action for false imprisonment. Although an argument may be
made that in order to protect a minor employee from harm by a
suspected shoplifter the minor should not be allowed to detain him,
who is to say that an eighteen year old is better qualified to avoid
danger than a sixteen year old may be? One of the arguments used
to avoid lowering the age of majority to eighteen was that the
eighteen-year-olds were not old enough to cope with adult respon-
sibilities. Perhaps the best way to remedy this would be to allow
only certain employees to detain a suspected shoplifter. This limi-
tation, however, would have an adverse effect on the merchant in
a small store for he has only a limited amount of employees to
begin with.
Another question which arises is what type of individual work-
ing in the merchant's store is considered to be a merchant's em-
ployee so as to qualify for the protection provided in the statute.
Wisconsin Statute section 102.070 provides a definition for the
However, this also was defeated.
This would appear to show some legislative intent to safeguard the rights of innocent
citizens by limiting the individuals privileged to detain a suspected shoplifter. Apparently
though, the legislature felt the amendments were too restrictive.
58. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 213.
59. In comparison to the Delaware Statutes, the term "adult employee" seems quite
liberal, for II DEL. C. § 647 (1970) provides that only the merchant or one of his employees
over the age of twenty-five years old is entitled to protection under the statute.
60. This section provides that:
Every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, implied or
express, all helpers and assistants of employees, whether paid by the employer or
employee, if employed with the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the employer,
including minors (who shall have the same power of contracting as adult employees),
but not including (a) domestic servants, (b) any person whose employment is not in
the course of a trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer, unless as
to any of said classes, such employer has elected to include them. Item (b) shall not
operate to exclude an employee whose employment is in the course of any trade,
business, profession or occupation of his employment, however casual, unusual,
desultory or isolated any such trade, business, profession or occupation may be.
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term "employee" as used in conjunction with workmen's compen-
sation. In Lincoln County v. Industrial Commission," the court
stated that the relation of "employer and employee" exists where
one performs work under a contract which compels him to do work
under the control of the employer and gives the employer the right
to direct his conduct and to dismiss him from service. With this
definition in mind, the question to be answered is whether a secu-
rity officer employed by a separate firm but hired to protct a store
is an employee entitled to protection as a merchant's employee
under section 943.50, or whether the employee is the employee of
the independent contractor.
According to the definitions found under section 102.07 the
vital questions for the purpose of determining whether a borrowed
employee retains his employment with his original employer or
becomes the employee of the special employer are whether the
employee actually or impliedly consented to work for the special
employer, whose work he was performing, who had the right to
control the details of the work being performed, and who was the
primary beneficiary of the work.6"
A way to possibly include a store detective as an employee of
the merchant is to strictly construe the independent contractor
relationship. An independent contractor is one who contracts to do
a specific job according to his own methods and without being
subject to the control of his hirer except as to the result of his work.
A contract providing for a continuous service of a store detective,
and not for a specific job, has been held to negate an independent
contract relationship. Further, the unrestricted right of the em-
ployer to end the particular service whenever he chooses, without
regard to the final result of the particular work itself has been held
to be almost conclusive evidence of an employer-employee
relationship. 3
The question of who is an employee, whether the employee's
acts were authorized, and whether he was acting within the "scope
of his employment" are also important in case the individual who
61. 228 Wis. 126, 179 N.W. 632 (1938).
62. Ryan Inc. of Wisconsin v. Industrial Commission, 39 Wis. 2d 646, 159 N.W.2d 594
(1968).
63. Adams v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 144 Misc. 27, 257 N.Y.S. 776 (1932). Besides this
approach, the case of Nelson v. R.H. Macy Co., 434 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. App. 1968), applied
the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold a department store liable for the acts of a police
officer employed by the department store during his duty hours to protect the store from,
and to apprehend shoplifters.
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detains the suspected shoplifter is judged not to have had sufficient
probable cause to do so or the detention is deemed to have been
unreasonable. In such a case if the employee's acts were authorized
and he was acting within the scope of employment, then the mer-
chant will be held liable for the acts of his employee. The majority
of courts do not require that express authority be given to the
employee in order to hold the merchant liable for the employee's
acts-he may be held liable on the theory of implied authority. The
reasoning behind this theory is that the employees entrusted with
property for sale or safe-keeping, or assigned to positions requiring
performance of certain duties to protect the property in the store,
have implied permission from their employers to do all things
proper and necessary to protect the property and to perform their
duties. Therefore, the employer becomes liable for his employee's
acts within the limits of the employee's implied authority and scope
of employment, however erroneous or mistaken the employee's
acts. 4 Also, the wider the permissible discretion an employee has,
the easier it is to find implied authority to detain the search. 5
The most important limit upon the "scope of employment"
requirement is that the employee must be in the act of recovering
his employer's property." Where an employee takes steps to punish
a suspected shoplifter, or to vindicate the law, or to punish what
he conceives to be a personal wrong, or to punish the invasion of
his personal rights, the employee is not performing his duties to sell
or protect his employer's property. He is acting outside the scope
of his employment, on a "frolic of his own". 7 For such actions,
64. J.J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S.W.2d 359 (1935) (liberality in favor
of the person imprisoned or otherwise injured must be exercised in determining the scope
of the authority of the agent and the responsibility of the principal); McCrory Stores
Corporation v. Satchell, 148 Md. 279, 129 A. 348 (1925). Here the store manager was held
to have acted within his implied authority, because the goods for resale were entrusted to
him for safe-keeping, in attempting to recover the goods he thought had been stolen; the
store owner was held liable for the manager's assault and false imprisonment of the plaintiff
erroneously suspected.
65. Id. at 82 S.W.2d at 363. Here it was stated that the designation of "manager" or
"assistant-manager" carried with it the implication of general power and permitted a rea-
sonable'inference of authority to conduct and control the employer's business in the store,
and that his acts were most surely those of the principal.
66. Long v. Eagle 5, 10 and 25¢ Store Co., 214 N.C. 146, 198 S.E. 573 (1938). Here
the court stated that the fact that the store manager called the police to arrest and search
the plaintiff did not relieve the store from liability; the fact that the store manager had the
plaintiff arrested and searched immediately was evidence showing that the manager was
attempting to protecting the employer's property.
67. Supra note 36, at 42.
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the employer cannot be held liable. The injured person's action is
against the employee.
Returning to the discussion of Wisconsin Statute section
943.50(3), although the merchant or his adult employee may have
had probable cause to detain, the qualified privilege of detention
without fear of liability for false imprisonment may be lost by the
manner in which it is exercised. Subsection (3) provides that the
suspected shoplifter may be detained if there is probable cause to
do so, but such person must be detained in a reasonable manner
and only for the reasonable length of time necessary in order to
deliver him to a peace officer or to his parent or guardian in the
case of a minor.18 Basically, what is a reasonable manner and a
reasonable length of time is within the domain of the jury69 and
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. A
court might decide that it is unreasonable as a matter of law to
search the person or seize goods in his possession. However, no
federal constitutional right is at stake, for the Fourth Amendment
protects citizens only from governmental searches and seizures and
not those by private persons. 0
The detention must be made in a reasonable manner. What is
reasonable depends upon the facts of each case. However, a ques-
tion which is not answered by the statute is whether the merchant
is permitted to use any force to detain a shoplifter who will not
remain voluntarily. According to Collyer,71 one may use only rea-
sonable force to effect the detention of a suspected shoplifter and
if this is exceeded, justification will be lost.72 Likewise, the right to
detain is no license to insult or abuse and if the actor is excessively
vehement there may be liability for slander 73 and assault as well. 74
68. Supra note 47. The right to detain a person in a reasonable manner for a reasonable
length of time for the purpose of investigation was first set forth in the Collyer case.
69. Delp v. Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 238 Ore. 538, 395 P.2d 137 (1964).
70. "Moreover, the Fourth Amendment protects only against searches and seizures
which are made under governmental authority, real or assumed, or under color of such
authority." Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921). The provisions of the Fourth
Amendment were applied to the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
71. Supra note 47.
72. Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1964); Teel v. May Department
Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W.2d 74, 137 A.L.R. 495 (1941).
73. Burnaman v. J.C. Penney Co., 181 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Tex. 1960); Little Stores v.
Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W.2d 13 (1943). In this case where the alleged defama-
tory words-"you didn't pay for your groceries"-were spoken in a crowd, a publication
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It is obviously beyond reason to confine a person in a small room
to compel a confession.75 One may request a confession, 7 for re-
covery of the goods is no less a confession, but he cannot compel
or coerce a confession. Nor is he allowed to conduct a search of
the person against his will. When the tenor of conduct begins to
more closely resemble punishing the offender than protecting prop-
erty, the merchant has gone as far as he can go. 77
In Wisconsin there are some specific requirements which must
be met in order for the detention to be deemed conducted in a
reasonable manner. The detained person must be promptly in-
formed of the purpose for the detention, given the opportunity to
make phone calls, and be asked if he would voluntarily confess or
allow a search. If he refuses to be interrogated or searched the
merchant may not do so against his will before the arrival of a
peace officer. If the merchant does, he is not entitled to the protec-
tion provided by this statute, for the detention would not be
deemed to have been conducted in a reasonable manner. 78 How-
ever, once the peace officer has arrived the officer may conduct a
lawful interrogation of the accused.
In addition to the requirement that the detention be conducted
in a reasonable manner, it must be conducted for only a reasonable
length of time. In Wisconsin the purpose of this detention is sup-
posedly limited to the summoning of a peace officer. Only if the
could be inferred without producing a witness who had heard it, but in the Burnaman case,
the court ruled against the plaintiff on the point of slander because they introduced no
evidence that the words-"Where is that red dress"-were heard in a defamatory sense.
74. Perry v. S.H. Kress Co., 187 Kan. 537, 358 P.2d 665 (1961). A false imprisonment
always involves a technical assault and if combined with a battery it does not change the
character of the action but merely serves to increase actual damages.
75. See, Wilde v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 160 So. 2d 839 (La. App.
1964); W.T. Grant Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 141 S.E. 860 (1928).
76. Collyer v. S.H. Kress Co., supra note 47.
77. 17 S.C. L. REv. 729, 739 (1965).
78. Capital Times, Dec. 4, 1969. This article stated that immediately after the passage
of the bill a conference was held in Madison involving the Madison Police Chief, Wilbur
Emery, the Assistant District Attorney, Andrew Somers, and numerous merchants. In reply
to a question concerning the questioning of suspected shoplifters both Emery and Somers
concurred in an opinion that only the police are required by law to inform a suspect of his
rights, and so the merchant could, with impunity, and without jeopardizing any case against
the suspect, question him to their heart's content. The article went on to add that:
The new law specifically forbids questioning a suspect against his will but, as a
private citizen not bound by the Miranda decision regarding police questioning
procedures, the merchant can ask anything. While the suspect needn't answer the
questions he probably wouldn't be aware of this and would testify against himself.
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individual voluntarily agrees to be interrogated or searched may
this be done during the detention. In view of this it may be said
that Wisconsin has set a presumptive limit on what constitutes a
reasonable time for the detention-that being the time until the
police arrive after being promptly notified.79
Other states also have this presumptive limit on what consti-
tutes a reasonable time; not more than thirty minutes in West
Virginia80 or more than one hour in Louisiana;8' until the police
arrive after being promptly notified in South Dakota; 2 and for
time to examine records in Hawaii83 and Washington.84
In general, whether the reasonable time requirement is met
depends heavily on the particular facts and circumstances of each
case. This could mean that if the police are not promptly notified
and the shoplifter is held for an unreasonable period of time, based
on the facts and circumstances of the case, the merchant could
forfeit the privilege given to him by section 943.50. In Collyer,85 a
detention of twenty to thirty minutes was reasonable; but approxi-
mately the same length of time consumed in attempts to extract a
signed confession would be patently unreasonable.8 It has also
been held that once the purpose for which the statute allows a
detention is satisfied-the goods are returned, 87 payment is tend-
ered,8 or the suspect is vindicated by the cashier 8"-any further
delay is unreasonable.
As mentioned previously, the purpose of this detention is to
deliver the suspected shoplifter to a peace officer or to his parents
or guardian in the case of a minor. It should be noted that the
statute does not say that the suspected shoplifter should be deliv-
ered only to his parents or guardian if a minor is involved. There-
fore, it would appear that any shoplifter, no matter what his age,
79. It may be assumed that Wisconsin has set a presumptive limit on what constitutes
a reasonable time, for Assembly Amendment 4 to Assembly Bill 730 which would have
limited a reasonable time to "not over one-half hour" was defeated.
80. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3A-4 (1971).
81. LSA-C.CR.P. art. 215 (1967).
82. SDCL § 22-37-24 (1967).
83. HAWAII REv. LAWS § 663-2 (1967).
84. RCWA 9.01.116 (1970).
85. Supra note 47.
86. Wilde v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, supra note 75.
87. Teel v. May Department Stores Co., supra note 72.
88. Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 438, 138 N.E. 843, 26 A.L.R. 1329
(1923).
89. Id. See also Little Stores v. Isenberg, supra note 73.
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may be held until the police arrive at which time he may be turned
over to them."
The second sentence of subsection (3) of section 943.50 pro-
vides guidelines for a reasonable detention and also sets forth the
rights of the suspect. This provides that the detained person must
be promptly informed of the purpose for the detention and be
permitted to make phone calls, but he shall not be interrogated or
searched against his will before the arrival of the peace officer who
may conduct a lawful interrogation of the accused person. When
speaking of the rights of the suspected shoplifter, it must be re-
membered that the merchant is merely detaining the suspect and
not arresting him. If he does arrest him, then section 943.50 will
not afford him any protection. With this in mind it may be easier
to understand why more rights are not given to the suspect. 1
However, a strict interpretation of the term "arrest" includes
the detention of a person. Therefore, it may be argued that, in
essence, this detention is really an arrest. But if this detention does
constitute an arrest then why isn't the merchant required to inform
the suspect of his rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona?92
Apparently, the Wisconsin Legislature has felt, as expressed by the
statute, that a detention under these circumstances is not an ar-
rest.13 However, in order to protect the suspected shoplifter some
90. Compare this with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.1 (1971) which provides that the mer-
chant should call the minor's parents or guardian ad litem while the minor is being detained.
91. In conjunction with this, Assembly Amendment 3 to Assembly Bill 730 proposed
to insert that:
Immediately upon initiating detention, the person being detained shall be advised
that he is not required to answer any questions, that anything he says may be taken
down and later used against him, that he may select and consult with an attorney
before speaking to the merchant, merchant's employee, or peace officer who is
seeking to detain him and that, if he cannot afford to retain an attorney the court
will appoint an attorney in the event the person detained is arrested and charged with
a violation of this chapter.
This amendment was defeated though. It would appear that the rights which this pro-
posed amendment would have given to the defendant are those given to a defendant after
he has been arrested and not just while he is being detained.
92. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Basically, before any interrogation may take place after an
arrest the accused must be informed that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can and will be used against him in court, that he may refuse to answer questions or
stop talking at any time, that he has the right to counsel being present at any interrogation
and that if he is indigent counsel will be appointed for him. In addition, before any interro-
gation may take place the accused must have expressly waived these rights and been willing
to engage in conversation.
93. This is a significant departure from the law of arrest, for in the case of State v.
Harrison, 260 Wis. 89, 50 N.W.2d 38 (1951), the court held that:
It was sufficient in respect to the time when the defendant was entitled to be
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safeguards against impulsive detentions are written into the
statute.
First, the suspected shoplifter must be informed of the purpose
for his detention. Probably the main reason for this requirement
is that ordinary citizens do not detain one another in this sense.94
Once the purpose of the detention is known the suspect may be able
to convince the merchant that he did, in fact, pay for the merchan-
dise or else that he returned the merchandise before leaving the
store.
The second safeguard is that the suspect must be permitted to
make phone calls. It may be assumed that this is in conformance
with Miranda95 in that probably the only way to have an attorney
present during any interrogation is to call him. However, it should
be noted that the statute does not state that the merchant must
inform the suspect that he will be permitted to make phone calls.
It merely states that he may do so. Therefore, if the suspect is not
aware of this privilege he may not exercise it although, in actuality,
he would like to have made a phone call. Since the legislature felt
that this safeguard was necessary enough to provide for it in the
statute, it is submitted that the merchant should be required to
inform the suspect that he has the right to make phone calls.
The final safeguard provided for the suspect is that the mer-
chant or his employee shall not interrogate or search the suspect
against his will. This seems only fair for if this is indeed only a
detention and not an arrest then there should be no interrogation
or search allowed. This is based on the fact that if a peace officer
is allowed to interrogate or search an individual in only limited
instances where no arrest has been made," then the ordinary citi-
zen should have no greater privilege when only a detention is
involved.
However, this safeguard, as worded in the statute, presents
informed of the nature of the offense, that she was informed thereof when the
complaint was read to her in court and before she pleaded guilty.
94. In conjunction with this see Wis. STAT. §§ 968.24 and 968.25 where the legislature
has determined that the "stop and frisk" laws of Wisconsin do not constitute an arrest but
merely a detention. However, the detention can turn into an arrest. U.S. v. Mitchell, 179
F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959) where the court held that the taking of a person, detained for
questioning, to a police telephone constituted a taking of the individual into custody. If
this occurs, then the police officer must inform the suspect of his rights under the Miranda
decision.
95. Supra note 92.




problems in that the statute merely states that the suspect should
not be interrogated or searched against his will. This would seem
to imply that the merchant can question or search the suspect
unless the suspect specifically objects. Then, if any incriminating
statements are made by the suspect or evidence is found concealed
on him by the merchant, this may be used against the suspect in
court to convict him of shoplifting. At least when an individual is
arrested he is informed, before the police interrogate him, that he
has the right to remain silent and that anything he says can and
will be used against him in court. It would appear that despite the
fact that we are merely dealing with a "detention" the same
Miranda statement of rights should be given to the suspect in this
situation in order to protect his constitutional rights. Otherwise, if
the suspect is ignorant of the fact that he may remain silent, he
may make some incriminating statement which he will later regret.
In conjunction with this, the statute further provides that when a
peace officer arrives he may conduct a lawful interrogation of the
suspect. It may be assumed that before this interrogation the peace
officer, because of the fact that he is making an arrest, will inform
the accused of his rights as set forth in Miranda.7 Therefore, if the
accused is informed of his rights before any statement will be given
to a peace officer, why should the merchant be allowed to interro-
gate the accused before the arrival of the officer and obtain the
same information which the officer will obtain? This most defi-
nitely appears to deprive the accused of his constitutional rights
against self-incrimination.
If these supposed safeguards are complied with and all the
other requirements of the statute are met then the statute states
that the merchant or his employee effecting the detention shall be
entitled to the same defense in any action against him as is avail-
able to a peace officer making an arrest in the line of duty." In
view of this if the merchant or his employee complies with the
statute he may not be liable in an action for false imprisonment,
false arrest, assault and battery (if only reasonable force is used
to detain the suspect) or slander.
One last problem deals with the application of this statute to a
97. Supra note 92.
98. The question of police protection from liability was brought up in the case of Rubin
v. Schrank, 207 Wis. 375, 241 N.W. 370 (1932). In that case the court held that a sheriff is
protected from liability in performing official duties when a writ is regular on its face and
he is not chargeable with knowledge to the contrary.
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situation where a municipality also has an ordinance dealing with
shoplifting. Which law should apply and under what circumstances
is one applied over the other? This problem may be especially
crucial if the municipality which has a shoplifting ordinance does
not provide the protection for the merchant which section 943.50
does.9
III. CONCLUSION
As one may readily note, there are numerous problems with the
Wisconsin shoplifting statute, especially in the area of protection
of constitutional rights. Originally the fear of possible improper
detentions and violation of civil liberties were the stumbling blocks
on which the merchandising associations failed in earlier legisla-
tures.'1° Evidently the evidence of thriving thievery became strong
enough to overcome this impediment and to persuade the lawmak-
ers to pass a statute pertaining to shoplifting. Despite this, the
rights of innocent citizens are also relevant to the shoplifting arrest
problem. A grant of power, if not carefully regulated, may lead to
an abuse of power, and few powers present as great a potential for
abuse as the arrest power. The rights of innocent citizens must be
protected from possible arbitrary actions by storekeepers.
Besides the possible constitutional questions involved, the mer-
chant may not be protected as he thinks, for any deviation from
the statute could subject the merchant or his employee to liability
for their actions. In view of this, the merchant should establish a
checklist or an operating procedure to guide his employees in these
situations-and see to it that they follow it. It would appear that
the merchant is allowed to protect his interests by questioning the
suspect, but he must follow certain guidelines which are designed
to protect the individual. He must have probable cause to investi-
gate the individual. He must conduct the investigation in a reason-
able manner, and he must be careful not to commit any act against
the suspect which is not necessary to protect his interest. [See
Appendix].
99. For instance, the City of Milwaukee has such an ordinance. Milwaukee, Wis.,
Ordinances § 105-74 (1970) contains almost the exact same wording as Wis. Stat. § 943.50.
However, the general practice in Milwaukee has been to prosecute under the city ordinance
if the accused was a first offender and the price of the merchandise taken was under $100.
This is to avail the accused of the counseling program in Milwaukee-a program in which
the accused "works off" his sentence by working for a charitable institution for a specific
period of time. A second offender is almost always prosecuted under the state statute.
100. Ever since 1959 merchandising trade associations have been trying to get a statute
pertaining to shoplifting through the legislature.
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As was stated by former Lt. Governor Jack Olson:
Since the merchants inevitably have to recover the cost of
shoplifting from the consumer by improving the method of de-
tecting, apprehending, and prosecuting the shoplifter, we are ben-
efiting not only the merchant, but the law-abiding citizen as well
by the passage of this statute. 1'
In essence, this statute should help alleviate the fears of many
merchants. But shouldn't it also protect the constitutional rights
of the accused? Inflammatory confrontations between merchants
jealous of their wares and citizens jealous of their rights will inevit-
ably lead to litigation over this ill-defined new power granted to
the merchant. The merchant who wishes to avoid paying for a
Supreme Court resolution of the undefined areas of the statute will
instruct his employees to operate within the strict ambits of the
statute, and to guard the rights of the individual as jealously as he
would guard his own.
ROBERT W. MUREN




Suggested Checklist for Merchants and their Employees so as to Avoid Liability
for False Imprisonment.
1. Only the merchant or his employees over the age of eighteen years old
should be allowed to detain a suspected shoplifter.
a. For larger stores who can afford to hire floorwalkers, it would
be preferrable to allow only those individuals to initiate any action
against a suspected shoplifter.
2. The merchant or employee effecting the detention should have probable
cause to do so. Ideally, this would be the situation where the merchant or his
employee saw the suspect take the merchandise, conceal it, and pass the last
check-out counter without paying for it. Although probable cause extends beyond
this situation, it is submitted that in order to obtain maximum protection under
the statute, the detention should only be made when the person effecting the
detention has actually seen the suspect take the merchandise and fail to pay for
it.
a. The merchant or one of his employees should never rely upon
the word of a customer as a basis for probable cause that another
customer has taken some merchandise without paying for it.
b. In conjunction with the question of probable cause, it may be
advisable to conduct a reasonable investigation before any detention is
actually made. This would include checking with the cashier and check-
ing the cash register tape given to the suspect for his purchases.
3. The purpose of a detention is to investigate the possibility of a theft of
the merchant's chattels only. Therefore, any detention should be effected and
conducted in a reasonable manner. This means avoiding a "scene" if at all possi-
ble. Shouting matches and the use of defamatory language should be avoided at
all costs-for fear of liability for libel or slander.
a. Use of force against a suspect is permitted if necessary to effect
a detention. However, only reasnable force should be exerted.
b. Although the statute does not state where the detention may be
effected, it may be assumed that if a suspect is stopped and detained
within the immediate vicinity of the store, that the detention will be
deemed to have been conducted in accordance with the statute.
4. Once an individual has been detained, the merchant or his employee
should immediately inform the suspect of the reason for the detention. This is for
the purpose of allowing the suspect a chance to exonerate himself and to prevent
any unnecessary detention.
5. Immediately after the detention has been effected, the police should be
notified. If the suspect is a minor, his parents should also be notified. This is
necessary for the suspect may be detained only for a reasonable length of time.
6. Although the statute states only that the suspect should be permitted to




7. Any search or interrogation must be conducted in a reasonable manner.
However, they may not be conducted against the suspect's will. Although the
statute does not so provide, it is submitted that the suspect should be informed
that he does not have to answer any questions or allow a search to be conducted.
If the suspect then expressly refuses to be searched or interrogated nothing further
should be done before the arrival of the police officer. Naturally, if the suspect
does not object, then he may be interrogated and searched. However, in no case
should the suspect be coerced or threatened into making a confession.
8. Finally, whenever a merchant or one of his employees detains a person
he should keep in mind that the accused is entitled to have his rights protected.
If the person effecting the detention keeps in mind that he should conduct the
detention in a manner in which he would wish to be detained, then there should
be no question as to the reasonableness of the detention.

